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A B S T R A C T
This study explores how energy might be conceptualised as a commons, a resource owned and managed by a
community with a system of rules for production and consumption. It tests one aspect of Elinor Ostrom's design
principles for successful management of common pool resources: that there should be community account-
ability for individual consumption behaviour. This is explored through interviews with participants in a
community demand response (DR) trial in an urban neighbourhood in the UK. Domestic DR can make a
contribution to balancing electricity supply and demand. This relies on smart meters, which raise vertical
(individual to large organisation) privacy concerns. Community and local approaches could motivate greater
levels of DR than price signals alone. We found that acting as part of a community is motivating, a conclusion
which supports local and community based roll out of smart meters. Mutually supportive, voluntary, and
anonymous sharing of information was welcomed. However, mutual monitoring was seen as an invasion of
horizontal (peer to peer) privacy. We conclude that the research agenda, which asks whether local commons-
based governance of electricity systems could provide social and environmental beneﬁts, is worth pursuing
further. This needs a shift in regulatory barriers and ‘governance-system neutral’ innovation funding.
1. Introduction
This paper explores the use of commons frameworks for urban
energy management, in the context of a community-based trial of
electricity demand response (DR) in a UK city. Despite substantial
literature on smart grids, including discussion of their system value,
DR, privacy concerns and community approaches (Beckel et al., 2014;
Kloza et al., 2013), there remains a gap in scholarship bringing
commons theory to this context.
The introduction provides background on the role of DR in a smart
energy system, in particular in relation to community based motivation
and privacy concerns, and outlines the potential contribution of
commons approaches to these challenges, focussing on the mechan-
isms of community accountability. The second section describes the
case study and methodology, and the third discusses the ﬁndings of the
interviews and focus group in relation to attitudes to privacy and
mutual monitoring for urban electricity DR. The conclusion highlights
the policy implications of applying commons approaches to local
energy systems.
1.1. Smart meters, feedback and demand response in a smart energy
system
A ‘smart’ energy system, or smart grid, is deﬁned by the UK
government and energy market regulator as “one which uses
information technology to intelligently integrate the actions of
users connected to it, in order to eﬃciently deliver secure, sustain-
able and economic electricity supplies” (BEIS and Ofgem, 2016, p.
7). The need to decarbonise our energy system is leading to a shift
towards decentralised and intermittent electricity generation, and
potentially electriﬁcation of heat and transport (Quiggin and
Wakeﬁeld, 2015). This creates a need for greater spatial and
temporal ﬂexibility in the electricity system. At the same time,
innovation in information technology creates an opportunity to use
‘smart’ technologies to achieve greater distributed ﬂexibility, in-
cluding active management of the timing of electricity demand to
support whole system balancing. Regulatory approaches for achiev-
ing this are being consulted on by the UK government (BEIS and
Ofgem, 2016).
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One mechanism for achieving ﬂexibility is demand response (DR) –
the decrease or increase of electricity demand in response to moments
of scarcity or abundance. In a domestic setting, this can be achieved by
shifting the time at which cooking, laundry, dishwashing, heating, and
other activities take place (Bulkeley et al., 2014; Frontier Economics
and Sustainability First, 2012; Strengers, 2013). The UK government
aims to achieve domestic DR through a combination of direct feedback
using in home displays (IHDs), which show real-time electricity
consumption; indirect feedback through informative bills; advice and
guidance; and motivational campaigns (DECC, 2015). Smart meters,
which record real-time electricity consumption, are a key enabling
technology for this, and are due to be rolled out to all households by
2020, as part of an EU directive implemented in UK policy (DECC and
Ofgem, 2011; Council Directive 2012).
1.2. Motivating demand response
Smart meters by themselves will not motivate changes in energy
consumption behaviour or social practices.2 As Strengers (2013) high-
lights, energy is consumed through everyday practices, which are
responsive to many other forms of feedback, in addition to feedback
on energy consumption. The time at which people do laundry is
inﬂuenced by factors such as the weather, clothing needs, work, school
and social schedules, and social expectations of cleanliness. Factors
such as housing costs, unemployment and changes in household
composition also aﬀect the energy consumption patterns in households
(Bulkeley et al., 2014). Inﬂuencing changes in behaviour through policy
interventions is complex. Several experts advocate the use of multiple
approaches to inform the development of behaviour change policy
(Chatterton, 2011; Darnton, 2008a; Gardner and Stern, 2002; Jackson,
2005), and emphasise the importance of testing these in practice
(Darnton, 2008a). Forms of motivation that have been well-researched
include price signals such as time of use tariﬀs and real-time pricing,
and educational feedback through IHDs, detailed billing and emails.
However, price-based incentives risk impacting those in fuel poverty
and exacerbating social inequalities (Thumim, 2014).
The focus of this study is on community-based interventions. The
concept of community is itself ambiguous. Burchell et al. (2014)
identify six meanings of ‘community’ in the literature on community
energy: “a place-based or local activity, an interest-based activity, a
community-led and collaborative process with beneﬁts distributed
fairly and locally, a mid-scale activity, an actor with agency, and an
experimental niche”. They also note the issues of “power, division,
exclusion, conﬂict and oppression” which can be part of community.
Community-based activities can be supported by social mechanisms
for behaviour change. Previous studies have made use of several social
mechanisms for motivating shifts in energy behaviour, including social
norms feedback (Burchell et al., 2016; Harries et al., 2013), peer
learning (Catney et al., 2013), and civic concerns (Ehrhardt-Martinez
et al., 2010). The Smart Communities project (Burchell et al., 2016)
trialled the use of IHDs and regular feedback emails in a community in
the UK. They highlight factors making their feedback successful: a
focus on the local; supportive, regular emails; and a framing that
emphasised the community working together which increased partici-
pants’ sense of self-eﬃcacy. This was successful in achieving lasting,
high levels of engagement with IHDs. These factors have a strong ﬁt
with the concept of ‘community’ and therefore support further research
into community-based approaches.
A community-based programme may be a good way to achieve high
quality feedback to households cost-eﬀectively at a large scale, by
enlisting the voluntary co-production of feedback by residents. The
importance of high quality feedback in motivating energy behaviour
change was identiﬁed by the VaasaETT (2011) study of 100 worldwide
smart meter pilot studies. They found that the most important success
factor was tailoring the programme to consumer needs, and that
smaller scale trials of less than 100 participants achieved higher levels
of energy conservation, perhaps due the quality of feedback provided to
smaller populations.
1.3. Smart meters, privacy and community DR
Whilst smart meters can support the use of renewable energy by
enabling balancing through DR, their use also raises concerns about
privacy and data (Beckel et al., 2014; Döbelt et al., 2015). DR and
smart meter data relates to activities as intimate as taking a shower,
doing laundry, or watching TV, and as distant and shared as our
national electricity infrastructure. It is thus both private and of public
concern. Real-time electricity consumption data can reveal occupancy,
a potential security concern if burglars can identify when a house is
empty. Highly granular data (measured every second or minute) can
reveal the ‘load signature’ of diﬀerent appliances being used, indicating
the “composition and behavior of individual households” (Horne et al.,
2015). This can be used for targeted marketing by corporations, and is
useful to researchers.
Privacy concerns about smart meters have the potential to impact
their public acceptability. Evidence on this, however, is inconclusive.
Horne et al. (2015) conclude that privacy concerns may lead to public
rejection of smart meters. However, this may depend on context, and
the acceptability of smart meters could be greater if the wider societal
beneﬁt of the smart grid is clearly communicated, and if individuals
feel that they have control over the technology installed in their home
(Buchanan et al., 2016).
Privacy concerns about smart meters extend beyond public accept-
ability. Key vertical privacy concerns in a smart energy system include
the risk to political rights and freedoms from state surveillance;
unequal power relations involved in big data; and potential for
corporate proﬁt from using personal data for targeted marketing.
Naus et al. (2015) identify two dimensions of privacy: the ‘vertical’
privacy of individuals relative to large organisations such as energy
companies, data companies and the state, and the ‘horizontal’ privacy
of individuals relative to their peers. Solove (2002) describes two
additional aspects of privacy: not being seen, and not being interfered
with. Solove (2001) discusses the need for privacy theory in the age of
‘big data’ to consider the unequal power relations of individuals to large
corporations and government, who can derive useful knowledge from
large quantities of data.
Some computer sciences studies on smart grids seek to preserve
privacy through the design of the information processing architecture
of the smart grid. Souri et al. (2014) classify privacy preserving
techniques in two categories. Those with aggregation have a local
gateway which processes individual smart meter data, and sends only
an aggregate to utilities or other parties, whereas those without
aggregation carry out privacy-preserving operations within the smart
meter itself, or by reliance on a trusted third party. In the UK, the
trusted third party approach has been chosen, with the Data
Communications Company set up for this purpose (Smart Energy
Code Company, 2013).
Trusted third party approaches to data protection have ongoing
vertical privacy risks, whereas aggregation approaches and in-meter
data processing reduce this risk. The use of a trusted third party relies
on that institution being trustworthy, and limits the user's control over
where their data goes. Privacy-preserving operations carried out within
the smart meter increase the computational requirements of the smart
meter itself (Souri et al., 2014), with some also aﬀecting system
management functionality derived from the smart meter.
Aggregation-based systems avoid the need to trust a centralised holder
of data, and reduce smart meter computational requirements, but carry
2 There has been extensive academic debate about the relative value of behaviour
change and social practice approaches to understanding and changing energy consump-
tion patterns. This study follows Wilson and Chatterton (2011) in seeing both approaches
as valuable and compatible.
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a risk in the case of the failure of the gateway (Souri et al., 2014). This
study considers a governance based approach: trading oﬀ vertical
privacy risk with a reduction in horizontal privacy, through community
based aggregation.
1.4. A commons framing
This paper adds to the existing literature by bringing a commons
framing to the development of the smart grid. A commons is deﬁned
here as a resource owned and managed by a community, with a system
of rules for production and consumption of the resource. For Bollier
(2014), a commons is “a resource + a community + a set of social
protocols”.
A commons is characterised by situations where there is a social
dilemma, or a need for collective action – which Darnton describes as a
“ ‘tyranny of small decisions’ whereby the outcome of millions of
individual decisions is at odds with what people collectively want”
(Darnton, 2008b, p. 6). Scholars including Künneke and Finger (2009),
Frischmann (2012) and Rose (1986) argue that infrastructure should
be considered a commons, due to the positive social and economic
externalities of universal access to energy, negative climate external-
ities of associated greenhouse gas emissions, and the natural monopoly
tendencies of energy infrastructure.
A commons is also characterised by consumption and production
activities being carried out by the same groups of individuals. This was
the case in historic agricultural and peasant communities, and is now
being rediscovered in a modern context with the concept of a
‘prosumer’ (Ritzer, 2010). This term is widely used in the context of
smart grids, both with reference to individuals (Mitchell, 2014;
Skjølsvold et al., 2015) practicing ‘self-consumption’, and with refer-
ence to community production and consumption (Hertig and Teufel,
2016; Karnouskos, 2011; Moreno-Munoz et al., 2016). At the same
time, the growth of the community energy sector in the UK and in other
countries (Bauwens et al., 2016; Blanchet, 2015; DECC, 2014; Seyfang
et al., 2013), and the movement for energy democracy (Angel, 2016;
Platform, 2014; Sweeney, 2012), shows an appetite for collective, local
participation in the development of the future energy system and
greater participation in energy system governance.
A community of prosumers needs new approaches for successful
governance, and could learn from management of traditional com-
mons. Elinor Ostrom (1990) developed a set of eight design principles
for successful management of common pool resources, through a meta-
analysis of traditional rural commons such as ﬁsheries, forests, pasture
land and irrigation systems worldwide. These are eﬀective in the
context of small-scale commons, with stable communities, not subject
to strong external disruption (Araral, 2013; Cox et al., 2010). The
design principles originally published by Ostrom in 1990 were updated
by Cox et al. (2010), following reviews of their robustness by many
researchers in the intervening years. Wilson et al. (2012) generalise the
use of Ostrom's design principles to other contexts. Roelich and Knoeri
(unpublished), use the design principles to analyse the UK community
energy sector. BuroHappold Engineering (2013) use Ostrom's design
principles as a framework for imagining a commons based arrange-
ment for a UK energy system, with a focus on community DR.
A successful community management institution is characterised by
the presence of all eight design principles, listed in full in the appendix.
However, this study focuses on one aspect, community accountability,
which is addressed by design principles 4, 5 and 63:
4A Monitoring users: Monitors who are accountable to the users
monitor the appropriation and provision levels of the users.
5 Graduated sanctions: Appropriators who violate operational rules
are likely to be assessed graduated sanctions (depending on the
seriousness and the context of the oﬀense) by other appropriators, by
oﬃcials accountable to the appropriators, or by both.
6 Conﬂict-resolution mechanisms: Appropriators and their oﬃcials
have rapid access to low-cost local arenas to resolve conﬂicts among
appropriators or between appropriators and oﬃcials.
This level of community accountability goes beyond the social
norms feedback of studies such as Smart Communities (Burchell
et al., 2016) or Customer-Led Network Revolution (Bulkeley et al.,
2014), with mutual monitoring impacting on horizontal privacy, and
community conﬂict-resolution and sanctioning giving some coercive
power to the community, rather than relying on internalised norms or
external parties to adjudicate.
Whilst there are some examples of small-scale commons-like
community management of electricity systems, these tend to be in
remote locations such as islands. For example, the community energy
system operating on the Scottish island of Eigg has a wind, solar and
hydro power based energy system, with batteries and backup diesel
generators. Islanders are allowed to consume up to a maximum of
5 kW of power at any given time (10 kW for businesses). If a household
goes above the 5 kW limit, they are automatically cut oﬀ, and the Eigg
energy maintenance team must be called to reconnect them
(Community Power Scotland and Friends of the Earth Scotland,
2016). When power availability is low, islanders are alerted through
a traﬃc light system with green/amber/red lights, and encouraged to
voluntarily reduce their consumption (Yadoo et al., 2011). This means
that household energy consumption below 5 kW is a private matter,
and any consumption above 5 kW becomes a public matter, depending
on how talkative the members of the maintenance team are.4
1.5. This study
Energy commons have been less explored in an urban context,
where much of the domestic electricity consumption of industrialised
countries takes place. This study was motivated by an interest in the
potential for neighbourhood-scale commons governance approaches to
motivate more sustainable energy consumption practices, whilst pro-
viding social beneﬁts of a greater sense of belonging, agency and social
connection, in the context of urban residential neighbourhoods.
However, researching this directly encounters regulatory barriers, a
challenging funding environment, and a steep learning curve for
research participants. This context is currently a competitive market
rather than a commons, where people are used to individually buying
energy from large companies.
Exploring commons in an urban context requires imagination, an
important step for social research that serves the development of a
better future (Levitas, 2013). One scenario could be a spatially nested
system, shown in Fig. 1 (adapted from BuroHappold Engineering,
2016), following the principle that large systems should be organised as
‘multiple layers of nested enterprise’ (Ostrom, 1990), with boundaries
of governance congruent with infrastructure boundaries (Cox, 2012).
This complements research on interconnected, islandable microgrids
(Stadler et al., 2016).
The spatially-nested system could reduce vertical privacy risk. With
appropriate computer programming, the problem of vertical privacy
and power relations could become a challenge of horizontal privacy and
power dynamics within the community, a shift which may or may not
feel desirable for diﬀerent individuals. Data from individual meters
could be aggregated at the boundary of the community, and the energy
supplier provided with real-time, temporally granular data for the area
3 The term ‘appropriator’ refers to consumer, and the ‘users’ are individuals who both
consume and produce or manage the resource. The phrase ‘assessed graduated sanctions’
means that a smaller sanction is demanded of an individual who breaks a rule for the ﬁrst
time, or in time of need, whereas a repeat or casual oﬀender will be more severely
sanctioned.
4 In practice, people on Eigg rarely go above the 5kW limit. However, the maintenance
team are aware of which households are using more energy overall, as they buy prepaid
energy tickets, and this is common knowledge in the island community (Leaver, 2016).
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as a whole rather than individual households. The community would
then be billed collectively for the value of their electricity consumption,
taking into account the time of use, and costs passed on to individuals
by the community. This is comparable to the virtual metering
arrangement used by the innovative Energy Local project (2015).
Domestic DR could make an important contribution to a smart,
ﬂexible energy system, enabled by smart meters. However, as past
research has shown, smart meters in themselves are insuﬃcient to
motivate DR, and could exacerbate fuel poverty. Community action shows
promise as an alternative or supplementary motivation to price signals.
Smart metering also raises concerns about data privacy and surveillance,
conceptualised in terms of vertical privacy risk. A commons approach
could protect vertical privacy by keeping detailed data within the
community, traded-oﬀ against reduced horizontal privacy. New energy
commons could learn from the experience of traditional commons,
including the use of community accountability mechanisms.
This research aimed to explore the potential for commons-based
neighbourhood energy management in an urban residential UK con-
text. In particular, we were interested in how ordinary people felt about
the idea of holding each other accountable for their energy consump-
tion, given the potential implications for privacy and the fact that
community accountability is alien to their current experience. This was
explored using a case study where participants had a partial experience
of an energy commons, in the form of a community-level incentive for
electricity DR. This approach allowed exploration of people's initial
responses to the idea of community accountability in a smart energy
system, through interviews and focus groups.
2. Methods
In order to explore energy commons framing in an urban context,
interviews and focus groups were conducted with participants involved
the Less is More project (LiM), which was testing the use of a
community incentive for electricity demand management (Centre for
Sustainable Energy, 2015a). The following section begins by describing
the LiM project and characteristics which make it suitable for this
study, before describing the interview and focus group methodology.
2.1. The Less is More project
The LiM project trialled the use of a community incentive for
electricity demand management at ten substations in the Western
Power Distribution (WPD) area, where the community around each
substation in the trial was oﬀered a ﬁnancial incentive of up to £5000
over the project period, earned by achieving target reductions in peak
and overall demand. The community suggested how to spend the
money earned. Minute-by-minute electricity demand data was re-
corded at the substation level by WPD, but no household level data
was recorded, due to privacy and data protection considerations.5 The
collective incentive created a commons situation, but there was no
direct community accountability of individuals. Progress towards
fundraising was shown on the graph on the LiM website which also
showed the target consumption line (see Fig. 2).
Community interventions were coordinated by the Centre for
Sustainable Energy (CSE), and engagement activities and events were
carried out by local charity and community partners. At the substation
chosen for the interviews, the project also trialled a speciﬁcally
designed energy monitor, the Greenbank Energy Monitor (GEM),
which enabled some awareness of the level of collective action taking
place in the community, a step towards the mutual monitoring
described by Ostrom's design principle 4 A, without infringing on
individuals’ privacy.
The GEM was designed to alert householders connected to the
substation of the times when the substation was under pressure (i.e.
times of peak demand). This prompted them to look for opportunities
to turn oﬀ or delay using electricity consuming devices in the home for
a period of time, called a ‘challenge’, which occurred once a day, at
some point during the evening, for 30–45 minutes. The GEM units
displayed one of two screens. Most of the time, the display showing was
the ‘default mode’ shown in Fig. 3. Once a challenge period started, the
display changed to the challenge screen, shown in Fig. 4.
The LiM project was designed with the intention that the GEM
would be in place for several months. However, due to delays in the
production and development of the GEM, it was in place for a shorter
duration than was originally planned,6 which may have aﬀected
participants’ perceptions of the GEM and reduced the extent to which
they discussed it with their neighbours. Full details of the LiM project,
and the methodology used, are available in the ﬁnal project report
produced by CSE (Centre for Sustainable Energy, 2015a).
2.2. Interviews and focus group methodology
The present study focused on the response of LiM participants in
the Greenbank substation area, where the GEM was used. All residents
of the substation area were invited to be interviewed, with a ﬂyer
posted through their door. CSE workers also promoted the research as
part of their project engagement activities. There were twelve respon-
dents overall, who received a payment of £15 for each session in which
they took part, funded by CSE. Interviews took place in the respon-
dent's home, and the focus group was held in a local community centre.
Fig. 1. Spatially nested energy system.
5 This was because the LiM project design involved monitoring the substation for
several months before the participants were aware that the study was happening, in order
to measure a baseline. It was judged to be acceptable to monitor the aggregate at the
substation level without informed consent, but not acceptable to do this at the individual
household level.
6 GEMs were installed in participants houses in a staggered way, over a period of two
weeks. This resulted in some participants having GEMs in place for 4 weeks, and others
for only 10 days. If they had been in place for longer, this may have resulted in reduction
of interest as the novelty wore oﬀ, but it may also have provided greater opportunity to
discuss with neighbours.
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Respondents had a basic understanding of and engagement with
DR due to their participation in LiM, where this was framed as a
community activity. They also had an experience of observing the
participation of others in their neighbourhood through their use of the
GEM, which provided a limited level of mutual monitoring. The sample
had no particular prior interest in energy conservation. However, self-
selection bias is possible as the more community-minded or energy-
conscious individuals may have responded to the interviews.
Only one of the research participants was male. All of those who
completed a demographic survey identiﬁed as white-British and were
aged between 25 and 55, with a mixture of house tenure types. At this
exploratory stage, with a small sample, the study was not intended to
be representative. Horne et al. (2015) report that privacy concerns in
their study were not related to demographic characteristics. However,
approaches to commons management may be related to demographic
characteristics. Further research might usefully explore this with
diﬀerent demographics.
The study consisted of three steps: a ﬁrst interview prior to the
installation of the GEM, with a total of twelve respondents; a second
interview at the end of the GEM implementation period, with seven of
the original twelve respondents; a ﬁnal focus group attended by ﬁve of
these seven respondents.
The ﬁrst interview aimed to understand how respondents’ sense of
community and level of social trust aﬀected their concern about free-
riding behaviour and desire to monitor others’ participation, and their
energy consumption patterns and perceptions of time of use ﬂexibility.
The second interview began with questions about the respondent's
experience of the GEM, including how easily they understood its
functioning, their perception of their neighbours’ participation in
‘challenge periods’, and their attitudes to the gadget and to having
information about others’ participation. It then raised questions about
local infrastructure, including hypothetical community responses to a
risk of local blackouts, and who should be responsible for investment in
electricity system reliability.
The focus group session started with a discussion of the GEMs,
two examples of which were in the room. In the ﬁrst stage, there was
minimal prompting from the facilitator. In the second stage, an
imaginary future scenario was introduced. This described a situation
where a neighbourhood had taken responsibility for keeping demand
below a certain peak, to manage stress on the local substation, and
had to deal with a blackout. After some clarifying discussion,
participants were asked how they would manage the grid in such a
scenario, with questions about the diﬀerence between diﬀerent
people's needs, privacy, allocation of responsibility, and decision-
making processes.
Qualitative analysis of the data employed a combination of induc-
tive and deductive approaches (Hyde, 2000; Morse and Mitcham,
2002). The central theoretical construct explored in the research was
community accountability for energy consuming behaviour. Themes
were introduced explicitly through the framing of the questions, but
analysis was carried out with attention to emergent as well as a priori
themes. All interviews and the focus group session were audio-recorded
and transcribed. They were coded in Nvivo with some codes arising out
of an a priori theoretical interest, and others emerging from the data.
For example, an a priori code of ‘community as motivation’ had a priori
sub-codes of ‘fun’ ‘fairness’ and ‘normal’, as well as sub-codes arising
from the data such as ‘part of a joint eﬀort’, ‘demonstration of possible’,
‘share ideas and learning’. These were developed in part through the
use of sensitizing concepts, (Bowen, 2006) such as ‘reasons why
Fig. 2. Example of screenshot from LiM website showing estimated, target, and actual, consumption (Centre for Sustainable Energy. 2015a, p. 18).
Fig. 3. GEM ‘default display’.
Fig. 4. GEM ‘challenge display’.
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respondents might ﬁnd community activity motivating’. Names of all
respondents were changed to pseudonyms to preserve anonymity.
3. Results and analysis
The following section presents a qualitative analysis of the interview
and focus group data focusing on participants’ views regarding privacy
and attitudes to neighbourhood accountability.
3.1. Exposure and retribution
Most respondents had mixed feelings about the idea of mutual
monitoring, expressing concerns about embarrassment and fear of
retribution, and hope for mutual support and sharing of knowledge.
The current status quo is one where individual household data is not
created at a highly granular time step, and the business as usual
deployment of smart meters would lead to reduction in vertical privacy,
but not of horizontal privacy.
The idea of community monitoring of each other's energy con-
sumption behaviour was framed through questions about whether
people would want to see when their neighbours were consuming
electricity, and whether they would want to know the names of who was
and wasn’t participating. Respondents’ views on sharing individual
energy consumption data with their neighbours were mostly negative
(with some ambivalent or neutral), particularly if this was for the
purposes of holding each other accountable. In particular there were
negative feelings about identiﬁcation of individual names. Participants
used vivid and violent metaphors such as ‘lynched’, ‘Hitler Youth’, ‘big
brother’ and ‘witch-hunt’ to express why they would not want
individual energy users to be identiﬁed in the community:
Interviewer: If there was a blackout, would you want to know who
did it?
Clara: No, because if it had been us then I would be terriﬁed of
being lynched.
Interviewer: And if it tells you the names of people?
Anna: I think that’d be horrible. I’d hate that I wouldn’t want to
participate if that was how it was going on, it would be a bit like
Hitler Youth or something wouldn’t it.
Interviewer: And if [a blackout] were to happen because a few
people were just using huge amounts of power would you want to
know who it was?
Frances: Well, now that's kind of more like one big brother
watching and it's also kind of scary like picking on one people, I
mean … I don’t know, I think that could go terribly wrong.
Interviewer: And if [a blackout] did happen, because a few people
were really maximising their power consumption, would you want
to know who it was?
Louise: Oh no, that's a localwitch-hunt! We’re far too nice round
here!
These metaphors evoke violent, unpredictable, unaccountable, arbi-
trary and irrational punishment for transgression, without any transpar-
ent process, with a threat of death. Violent punishment is pictured by
respondents, although the question only referred to information about
who has transgressed, with no mention of sanctioning. In contrast to the
violent images evoked by respondents, Ostrom's ﬁfth and sixth design
principles refer to graduated sanctions and accessible conﬂict-resolution
mechanisms. These are accountable, transparent and proportionate
systems designed to maintain community trust rather than instil fear.
However, Clara, Anna, Frances and Louise clearly did not perceive
community accountability as calm, fair and rational.
A community DR approach is conceived by the authors as a way of
trading oﬀ some horizontal privacy for the sake of protecting vertical
privacy. In this context, it is interesting that metaphors used by
Frances, Louise and Anna (big brother, witch hunt, Hitler Youth)
originate in historic or literary situations where an oppressive force of
the state, political party or church recruited local people or technology
to spy on each other – a situation involving infringement of both
vertical and horizontal privacy for the purposes of the control by
totalitarian regimes. The unequal power relations of the individual to
the large organisation is central here. However, these metaphors are
being used by interview respondents in the context of horizontal
privacy, rather than vertical privacy.
Whereas the terms such as ‘big brother’ discussed above related
primarily to the aspect of privacy that is about freedom from coercion,
respondents also had concerns about being seen, embarrassment, or
their reputation, using words such as ‘voyeuristic’, ‘too much informa-
tion’, ‘singles people out’, or simply expressing a general discomfort
‘don’t think I would want my name there’, as shown in the following
excerpts from three interviews.
Interviewer: And if you could identify who the people were that
were logging on, would you have felt more or less inclined to do it
yourself?
Clara: I think I preferred the anonymity of it. I think if people were
identiﬁed by house number it would be a bit, not voyeuristic but
a bit too much information almost.
Interviewer: And what kind of information would you like to see if
you wanted to know how many others were participating in the
project?
Frances: I wouldn’t want to know what houses were, because I feel
like that singles people out and that's not the goal of it
Interviewer: And what if the website told you the names of people?
Josie: Don’t think that's particularly a good, no I wouldn’t really be
bothered about that and I don’t think I would want my name
there either.
The following excerpt, from the ﬁrst interview with Clara, is more
ambivalent. She thinks that having more information about neigh-
bours’ energy consumption would be ‘interesting’ and create a sense of
‘something going on’, and she also feels that energy saving is ‘really,
really important’ and that she would ‘take it seriously’. However,
naming individuals could lead to ‘embarrassment’ and ‘shame’:
Interviewer:What if it gave you the names of the people who were
joining in?
Clara: I think I’d be quite embarrassed [laughter], I think it’s
quite, you wouldn’t want it to be like a name shame thing but
you’d have the house numbers but then again how personal does it
get. Obviously it’s all for awareness and not to name and shame
but it’s like I think it’d be quite interesting. If you do it by street
that would be quite anonymous or at least let you feel that
there’s something going on, yeah.
Interviewer: And is there anything about the idea that other people
that are participating about it being more fair that others are
joining in and doing your bit...?
Clara: Okay so you mean say if my next door neighbours decided
not to do it and I feel a bit aggrieved by it?
Interviewer: Yeah.
Clara: I don’t think, I don’t know if the word ‘fair’ would be more,
you want to be quite cohesive don’t you as a neighbour you want
to feel that you’re working together so if this kind of thing
takes oﬀ and so it would be, yeah I don’t think, and obviously I’d
take it seriously but I wouldn’t but not to the point that it clearly
disrupting my relationships with my neighbours. I don’t think
it’s not the ﬁrst thing I would launch into talking to them about
because it might seem a bit mean although I do feel it’s really,
really important and would be really good if whoever moves in
on either side got involved. I’d be really happy to chat to them
about it but it would be yeah I don’t know if it would feel it’s unfair,
I’d just feel a bit like, “Oh that’s a shame.”
Although Clara's understanding of the question about fairness is
clear, her response is uncertain. This reﬂects an ambivalence of
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considering energy eﬃciency to be important, and wanting neighbours
to participate, but feeling that relationships with neighbours are more
important.
3.2. Perception of impact, social connection and peer learning
On the other hand, several participants, including some of those
who had concerns about privacy discussed above, identiﬁed a number
of positive aspects of sharing information about energy consumption
within the community. These included making individual actions feel
more worthwhile, social motivations of meeting others, and the
potential for support through sharing tips and information.
Respondents expressed a sense of feeling more eﬀective when
acting with other people than individually, in the context of neighbour-
hood or community energy demand reduction or peak shifting projects,
e.g.
Clara: sometimes it feels a bit futile if you don’t think anyone else is
doing it. So I think if you know that other people are doing it, it
makes you feel you’re having a bigger impact. (with similar
comments made by Gloria, Kelly and Josie).
This ﬁnding is supported by Burchell et al. (2016, p. 182), who
report a respondent feeling that acting as part of the local area can
make more of a diﬀerence than acting as an individual. Josie, Kelly,
Beth, Gloria, Anna and Louise also mentioned being motivated by
meeting people or doing things together, social cohesion and commu-
nity involvement, or community activities.
LiM respondents were generally interested in having access to
detailed information about their own electricity consumption, in
order to learn how to adjust their behaviour: “being able to see your
own usage and when your own peak times are and make adjust-
ments” (Emma, with similar comments made by Kelly, Anna and
Clara).
The idea of knowing how their energy consumption compared
with others, particularly others who were similar to them, in terms of
number/age of children, type of heating system, house occupancy
patterns etc. was discussed enthusiastically in the focus group. This
is supported by VaasaETT (2011, p. 46): “If comparisons are to be
made then it must be to households of a like description”. Some level
of sharing of information between participants would also be
welcome for the purposes of enabling mutually supportive shared
learning, sharing ideas and hints and tips. Several respondents
expressed a desire for sharing learning (Frances, Louise, Kelly,
Imogen), or observed that knowing what neighbours had done
would be an inspiring demonstration of what is possible (Gloria,
Anna). This idea of a learning community supports the development
of ‘energy know-how’ discussed by Burchell et al. (2013), and the
ﬁndings of Catney et al. (2013), on the value of “Community
Knowledge Networks”, which provide opportunities for peer learn-
ing about energy through discussion and sharing of tacit knowledge
in a face to face interaction, ‘making energy discussable’ in an
atmosphere of conviviality (RECCKN, 2013).
3.3. Fairness, accountability and recognition of diverse needs and
capabilities
Respondents’ concerns about horizontal privacy point to a fear
that community based enforcement of acceptable energy use beha-
viour may be unpleasant, and less desirable than the bureaucratic,
centrally administrated system of billing and metering currently in
place. On the other hand, bureaucratic decision making processes can
block creative and human responses to individual needs (Solove,
1999). This raises questions of fairness, judgment, and bias. Would
devolution of enforcement of fair energy consumption behaviour to a
local community result in more or less fair, compassionate and
desirable outcomes?
Respondents were accepting of the diverse needs and capabilities of
individuals in their community, in relation to the ﬂexibility of their
energy consumption:
Imogen: I think if someone can only do a tiny bit but they’ve
actually done that tiny bit, it's all part of the bigger picture isn’t it
Frances: It’s also really hard because you don’t know the
situation of the people in the house. Like you don’t know ability
wise, you don’t know anything about these people. So just to switch
oﬀ, pick and choose to switch oﬀ someone’s electricity it’s like yeah
… I know that we could make do and we’d be ﬁne. We might be a
bit cranky but we’ll be ﬁne. But there are other houses maybe
they couldn’t or maybe there’s something about them that
we don’t know on multiple levels.
This acceptance of the diversity of the population supports the idea
that community groups could develop their own sense of fairness and
be compassionately responsive to individual needs. The comments
express a compassion that contradicts the fear of mob violence
expressed in the ‘big brother’ discourse.
Frances also pragmatically recognises that “there's always going to
be people that don’t participate”, a ﬁnding supported by Burchell et al.
(2016), who note a ‘pyramid of participation’, in their project. This
acceptance of free-riding, and potentially willingness to compensate for
those who do not contribute, might be diﬀerent in a context where the
community provided the only mechanism of accountability, rather than
an additional layer alongside the contractual relationship of buying
energy. Although ‘witch hunt’ and ‘lynched’ seem to be dramatic
exaggerations, vigilante justice systems do develop in human societies
(Weisburd, 1988). The outcomes of a community based justice system
may not necessarily be desirable.
The question of diverse needs also relates to horizontal privacy –
judging whether individuals should be entitled to favourable energy
access would involve access to detailed information about personal
matters. The comment by Frances above implies an awareness of the
privacy associated with diﬀerent people's needs “you don’t know the
situation” “something about them that we don’t know on multiple
levels”.
It is also possible that respondents’ attitudes to diﬀerent people's
needs may be gendered, or subject to self-selection bias, with more
socially minded people choosing to respond to research interviews.
Levels of social trust of respondents were moderate to high, with the
greatest social trust for colleagues, people working in local food shops,
and people in the neighbourhood, and the lowest for the local
councillor and local council. There was a stronger association between
trust in people in the neighbourhood and motivation to save energy if
others were doing so than between general social trust and community
motivation. This high level of social trust may be related to respon-
dents’ accepting attitudes to the diverse energy needs within the
neighbourhood. Attitudes may be diﬀerent in another neighbourhood
or with diﬀerent demographics.
3.4. Community accountability and responsibility for infrastructure
Attitudes to mutual monitoring may be aﬀected by the experience of
responsibility for infrastructure. The discussion above shows that
respondents saw mutual monitoring positively as an optional way of
mutually supporting each other to choose ethical energy consumption
behaviours. However, it was seen negatively in the context of enforced
neighbourhood accountability. This ambivalent response challenges
the applicability of community accountability in this neighbourhood
electricity context. However, attitudes to community accountability
may be diﬀerent in a neighbourhood electricity commons where
neighbourhoods had full responsibility for their infrastructure. This
was explored through discussion of a scenario in focus groups.
In the LiM interviews, responsibility for infrastructure was a novel
concept for most participants, introduced during the second interview
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and the focus group. Some respondents felt that the project had
increased their personal sense of responsibility for local electricity
infrastructure, talking about being more mindful and aware of their
own impact. Others felt that it had not changed.
Imogen developed ideas of how a community based balancing
system could be operated, in a way that would preserve privacy.
Interviewer:Yeah, and if it did kind of trip and cause a black-out
because of a few households really putting everything on, would
you want to know who it was?
Imogen: Erm, not as such as in starting to get accusatory but I’d
want to know that something was being done about it. So there
wouldn’t be my part to it, you know, you’d hope that there would
be enough support and education going out. Then actually if that’s
doing that from one or two households, surely there should be
some controls where you can stop it happening, so that household’s
limited. So that basically there’s some trip switch on that
house so it doesn’t aﬀect everyone else. So it could be
actually that you do have ﬂashing lights that say you’re getting
close to your consumption max and switch oﬀ, switch on, warn-
ing lights. Then if you don’t do that your supply is shut oﬀ.
The system she describes, with a physical limit on the power that
can be used by each house, and warning lights to let people know when
the limit is being reached, has much in common with the community
energy system on the isle of Eigg described in the introduction.
When prompted to think about the potential for community
decision making about local energy management, there was a mixed
response, with some scepticism about whether people would have the
time to participate locally, and an awareness that it may be diﬃcult to
get a suﬃcient percentage of the population interested. Two respon-
dents referred to a local self-build community where they thought it
could be easier to manage an energy commons.
Kelly saw the time needed to manage a community energy system
as requiring a paid position:
Kelly: Well it gives you more control but, again, you’d need people
to do that and they’d cost. I don’t think people have got enough
voluntary time to do it, it would have to be paid, proper salaried
posts to do all that
Others commented that the decision making itself would take time,
with some feeling positive about meeting together, and others con-
sidering that it would be diﬃcult to ﬁnd the time to meet. Clara
observes that energy companies provide value by making these kinds of
decisions:
ClaraIf it’s a decision making process people might ﬁnd that quite
frustrating. So, for example, if we had to vote for particular items
or aspects of the system then that might be quite problematic
InterviewerAnd why do you say the decision making process would
be frustrating and problematic?
ClaraMaybe it’s time consuming for people and slows the processes
down. And I suppose when you … I don’t know if we partly
pay certain companies like energy companies for making
decisions that we don’t have to think about. And that’s what
people, that's maybe part of the premium.
Interviewer Yeah. You think that’s a good thing?
ClaraI think it makes our lives easier, I wouldn’t say it was
necessarily a good thing. If you look at, obviously, energy prices
but there’s lots of diﬀerent variables within that I’m aware. I don’t
know if that's … I don’t know about the transparency of the system
and where the money goes, so …
In practice, the day to day decisions involved may not be too
onerous. For example, on Eigg, a maintenance team accountable to the
residents takes most of the decisions (Leaver, 2016).
4. Conclusions and policy implications
4.1. Overall conclusions and further research
This study is part of a research agenda which asks whether local
commons-based governance of electricity systems could provide social
and environmental beneﬁts. Regarding the applicability and usefulness
of a commons approach to electricity in urban settings, this study is
inconclusive. We believe that this wider research agenda is worth
further investigation. Pursing this research agenda directly is limited
by: regulatory barriers to innovation in an energy system where
reliability is a priority (Lockwood et al., 2015); a policy framing that
prioritises competitive market solutions and cost reﬂexivity (BEIS and
Ofgem, 2016) and an objective of narrow economic eﬃciency; and
innovation funding which is framed in a similarly narrow way.
This study has provided insights that reﬁne the wider research
agenda, in particular people's initial responses to the community
accountability element of a commons approach, and to taking respon-
sibility for energy infrastructure at the local level. These ideas partially
resonated with respondents, and appealed to their sense of community,
desire to connect with others, compassion and recognition of diﬀerent
people's needs and circumstances, and the desire to work together with
others in mutually supportive relationships. Participants engaged in
lively discussion of the scenarios for community-based management.
They were motivated by the idea that they were not acting alone, but as
part of a collective eﬀort and welcoming of comparison with neighbours
for the purposes of sharing knowledge and supporting each other. This
implies that the ideas are worth pursuing.
At the same time, the idea of community accountability was alien
and frightening to respondents, who described concerns about protect-
ing horizontal privacy and disproportionate community retribution
using emotive metaphors. They were concerned about the time that
would be needed to participate in community decisions about energy,
given busy work and family lives. These are all issues of relationships,
supporting the growing literature on the importance of relationships in
energy demand and energy eﬃciency (Burningham and Venn, 2016;
Butler et al., 2016; Jamieson, 2016). Developing a commons energy
system would also involve a steep learning curve for participants, and
have wider social implications.
This raises a number of questions for further research, which would
best by explored in an commons electricity institution trial, with an
action research approach supporting active engagement, ownership
and institutional innovation by the research participants. Would people
be interested in participating in a trial of community accountability and
shared electricity use? How would a lived reality of commons govern-
ance aﬀect self-reported attitudes towards community accountability?
Would a commons situation lead to an increase in bad conﬂict in a
community? Could participants learn healthy strategies for addressing
conﬂict that strengthen communities? How could such a system work
in a context of 9–5 work and nuclear families? Could it catalyse
changes in these patterns? It would also be interesting to better
understand people's perceptions of horizontal and vertical privacy in
the context of energy, and whether computer science could ensure
community based aggregation addresses the residual vertical privacy
risks of currently proposed privacy preservation techniques, as a trade
oﬀ against the reduction in horizontal privacy.
4.2. Implications for future UK energy systems
Policy and regulation is already moving towards enabling innova-
tion, with the regulator consulting on Non-Traditional Business Models
(Ofgem, 2015), launching a centre for innovation, and considering the
development of a ‘regulatory sandbox’ (Ofgem, 2016). This would be a
welcome space to trial a commons-based local electricity institution,
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and test the value this could oﬀer to the local community and to the
wider system.
Energy systems are changing radically. The old model of centralised
provision of services to a passive, dependent consumer is being challenged
by prosumers carrying out provision and production activities, and the
narrow focus on competition and cost reﬂexivity (Ofgem, 2016) may lead
to missed opportunities. The example of the isle of Eigg shows that
communities can successfully manage electricity systems, and live well
within consumption limits, something which could be useful for achieving
demand reduction. However, existing government approaches to domestic
DR are highly individualised, and innovation funding focuses on technol-
ogy, business models and commercial arrangements. Innovation funding
should aim to be ‘governance system neutral’ as well as ‘technology
neutral’. Projects whose value may be non-monetary and based on peer
sharing need to be supported, and the positive social and environmental
externalities valued in energy policy.
4.3. Implications for the current roll out of smart meters
There are also more immediate policy implications. Smart meters
are currently being rolled out in the EU and other countries (Council
Directive, 2012). The results of this study showed that community and
commons approaches could be a powerful tool for capturing the full
value of the smart meter roll out, as part of a smart grid. It is therefore
important that technology and institutional lock-in should not prevent
the development of innovative grassroots initiative. This could be
supported by ensuring that locally accountable third parties are able
to access smart meter data without excessively onerous regulatory
barriers, whilst protecting individual freedom and privacy; by support-
ing locally-based roll out of smart meters, as proposed by the Bristol
Smart Energy City Collaboration (Centre for Sustainable Energy,
2015b); and by providing innovation funding for the development of
local community energy institutions which would support peer learning
and eﬀective use of smart grid technology for local beneﬁt. The
motivating aspect of acting collectively could be supported by making
visible the collective impact of actions.
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Appendix: full list of Ostrom's design principles
Design Principles for successful groups as updated by Cox
et al. (2010), developed from those originally published in
(Ostrom, 1990).
1. Clearly deﬁned user boundaries: Individuals or households who
have rights to withdraw resource units from the common-pool
resource (CPR) must be clearly deﬁned.
1. Clear boundaries of resource system: The boundaries of the CPR
must be well deﬁned.
2. Congruence with local conditions: Appropriation and provision rules
are congruent with local social and environmental conditions.
2. Beneﬁts of appropriation and provision inputs are proportionate
3. Collective-choice arrangements: Most individuals aﬀected by the
operational rules can participate in modifying the operational
rules.
4. Monitoring users: Monitors who are accountable to the users
monitor the appropriation and provision levels of the users.
4. Monitoring the resource: Monitors who are accountable to the
users monitor the condition of the resource.
5. Graduated sanctions: Appropriators who violate operational rules
are likely to be assessed graduated sanctions (depending on the
seriousness and the context of the oﬀense) by other appropriators,
by oﬃcials accountable to the appropriators, or by both.
6. Conﬂict-resolution mechanisms: Appropriators and their oﬃcials
have rapid access to low-cost local arenas to resolve conﬂicts
among appropriators or between appropriators and oﬃcials.
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize: The rights of appro-
priators to devise their own institutions are not challenged by
external governmental authorities.
8. Nested enterprises: Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enfor-
cement, conﬂict resolution, and governance activities are orga-
nized in multiple layers of nested enterprises.
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